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Abstract 
 
In this commentary I address different forms of corporate violence, in particular how 
some contemporary corporate practices result in violence. Violence is carried out often 
without impunity by a market-state nexus that enables accumulation by dispossession. 
Structural violence concentrates power on certain groups while creating a class of disposable 
labor. Epistemic violence involves using language and law to disempower specific groups of 
people. The state often uses instrumental violence to quell resistance. I discuss how violence 
operates in the political economy by discussing conflicts in the extractive industries. 
 
Keywords: Violence, dispossession, development, corporate social responsibility, 
conflict,  
 
 
 
I was pleased and surprised when asked to write a commentary for this special issue 
on the topic of violence, markets and marketing.  Surprised because critical voices in the 
discipline of marketing are few and far between and pleased because such an important topic 
was being addressed in a relatively mainstream journal.  Sadly violence is a ubiquitous part 
of our society and we are surrounded by it: the media regularly feeds us with stories of 
violence and violence is an integral part of the entertainment industry in films, television, 
toys and video games.  And while there is some attention paid to the marketing of violence 
(to children through video games for example) little is known about the violence of 
marketing, by which I mean forms of dispossession that result from specific corporate 
practices. 
 
In some of my earlier work I had explored how some contemporary corporate 
practices result in dispossession and violence.  Drawing from theoretical perspectives in 
political philosophy, particularly the works of Agamben (1998; 2005), Harvey (2005) and 
Mbembe’s (2003) theory of necropolitics I developed the concept of necrocapitalism, which I 
defined as ‘practices of accumulation by transnational corporations that involve 
dispossession, death, torture, suicide, slavery, destruction of livelihoods, and the general 
management of violence’ (Banerjee, 2008a: 1548).  Violence and dispossession result from a 
variety of practices arising from the market-state nexus such as the marketization of security 
services through private military forces, privatization of land and resources, restrictions on 
public use of common property resources, conflicts over resource extraction, intellectual 
property rights on life forms, and forceful displacement of peasant populations.  Many of 
these practices are carried out in the name of ‘development’ in the poorer regions of the 
world where violence and dispossession are managed through extraction, exclusion and 
expulsion (Banerjee, 2011b).  
 
A more nuanced understanding reveals different aspects of violence that go beyond 
physical force or psychological violence.  The modern nation state is constructed as the sole 
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purveyor of ‘legitimate’ violence that allows it to use physical force through its police and 
armed forces.  The state’s monopoly on violence elides the fact that the modern nation state 
itself emerged out of violence.  The state’s use of violence is not just to protect its citizens 
and maintain law and order but also to quell dissidence and resistance to current social and 
economic organization.  In addition to this form of instrumental violence there is also 
structural violence that concentrates power on certain social groups – for example the caste 
system in India and the structural violence of neoliberal capitalism that has created the 
precariat class of disposable labor.  Less easily seen are forms of epistemic violence where 
language, law and discourse are used to marginalize and disempower specific groups of 
people.  Under colonialism, violence operated in the name of civilization and development 
where a particular scientific episteme created and sustained categories of civilized-barbaric 
and developed-underdeveloped.  As Said (1993: 8) argues these ideological formations 
assumed that certain territories and people actually ‘require and beseech domination, as well 
as forms of knowledge affiliated with domination’.  Sovereignty of Indigenous populations 
was no longer contingent on local social, political and cultural norms but depended on the 
extent they could be ‘civilized’ and ‘developed’. 
 
A similar process of erosion of Indigenous sovereignty is taking place in postcolonial 
nations. For the former colonies in Africa, Asia and Latin America independence from 
colonial rule did not mean that all populations enjoyed the benefits of sovereignty. 
Indigenous sovereignty was never fully realized in these postcolonial states where direct 
colonialism was replaced by elite nationalism. The transition from colonialism to nationalism 
while marking a postcolonial moment for the nation state excluded large segments of its 
populations who were now governed by the same rationality that inscribed the colonial 
project. Indigenous peoples often found themselves in conflict with the newly formed states 
as developmental projects invariably led to resource extraction, loss of livelihoods and 
dispossession.  
 
Similar histories of violence accompanied the development discourse, which was a 
scientific and technological process that subsumed differences in culture while classifying 
groups of people as ‘underdeveloped’ and local economies as ‘subsistence’ needing 
interventions based on the assimilative imperatives of development (Escobar 1995).  As I 
have pointed out elsewhere, later discourses of ‘sustainable development’ continued to be 
informed by colonial thought and unitary knowledge systems that privileged ecological 
modernization over ecological justice (Banerjee, 2003).  Conflicts over the patenting of seeds 
and life forms through biotechnology reflect these tensions.  Knowledge about medicinal 
properties of plants that have been an integral part of the cultural fabric of rural communities 
for thousands of years are classified as ‘traditional ecological knowledge’ that exists in the 
prior public domain and are not considered ‘intellectual property’.  However, corporations 
can claim intellectual property rights for extracts that have been genetically modified from 
living plants.  This ‘biopiracy’ is a form of violence which relies on a system of multiple 
exclusions that denies indigenous knowledge and agricultural practices (Shiva, 1993). 
 
The epidemic of farmer suicides in India can also be seen as an outcome of market 
violence. India was forced to open its seed sector to global corporations due to structural 
adjustment policies of the World Bank, transforming the agricultural sector and threatening 
the livelihoods of subsistence farmers who now had to buy seeds from the market.  Activists 
have claimed that the widespread use of Monsanto’s genetically modified Bt cotton seeds 
have led to farmer suicides (Thomas & De Tavernier, 2017).  While the factors related to 
famer suicides are more complex the fact remains that technology transformed seeds from a 
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renewable resource to a non-renewable one leading to patented hybrids that farmers were 
forced to purchase from the market.  The rush to grow cash crops such as cotton also 
transformed a diverse agricultural system to monocropping, which further exacerbated 
vulnerabilities of the crop to pests, diseases and made them more dependent on expensive 
pesticides and fertilizers. 
 
Barring some exceptions these topics rarely appear in the academic journals in the 
business disciplines despite the fact that corporations are directly or indirectly involved in 
forms of dispossession and violence.  State complicity with corporate actors is widespread in 
these cases where corporations use the state’s ‘legitimate’ forces to quell resistance to 
projects (Banerjee, 2011a).  For instance, in analyzing Coca Cola’s response to local 
villagers’ resistance to their operations in India Varman and Al-Almoudi (2016) found that 
the company used a variety of intimidation and bullying tactics to silence protestors including 
state violence through police forces against workers attempting to unionize as well as bribing 
state officials to gain support for their operations.  A key insight from this study is how 
corporations employ counter-resistance tactics to continue processes of violence and 
dispossession.  Similar tactics were used in a mining conflict in eastern India where the 
mining corporation Vedanta was able to undermine community resistance though 
intimidation, physical violence, and a divide-and-rule strategy that isolated groups opposed to 
mining while rewarding others through money and gifts as part of their corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) based philanthropic activities (Kraemer et al., 2013). 
 
This brings us to a troubling question:  what role does CSR play in addressing 
corporate and market violence?  Does it stop corporations from doing bad things?  Or by 
publicizing the good that corporations do does CSR instead provide a smokescreen that 
allows them to do bad things?  The literature is overwhelmingly positive about CSR being a 
force for good.  For example, in explaining the political role of corporations, Scherer et al. 
(2016: 276) define political CSR as ‘those responsible business activities that turn 
corporations into political actors, by engaging in public deliberations, collective decisions, 
and the provision of public goods or the restriction of public bads in cases where public 
authorities are unable or unwilling to fulfill this role’.  They point to examples where 
corporations contribute to ‘different areas of governance’ such as public health, education, 
social and environmental standards, climate change, corruption and inequality.  By engaging 
with a wide range of stakeholders CSR can provide ‘moral legitimacy’ to corporations, help 
‘rebalance the power between governments and corporations’ and ‘permit more democratic 
control on the public use of corporate power’ and ‘fill the regulatory vacuum in global 
governance’ (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011: Scherer et al., 2016).  While it is tempting to accept 
such a rosy view of corporations spreading peace and democracy throughout the world the 
reality is somewhat grimmer, as evidenced by ongoing violent conflicts between corporations 
and local communities (Banerjee, 2008b). 
 
A key assumption in political CSR is that a multi-stakeholder engagement process 
involving corporations, NGOs and government agencies will result in pro-social and pro-
environmental outcomes or at least minimize harm done by corporate activity.  However, 
simply engaging with NGOs does not always lead to positive environmental and social 
outcomes but can result in further marginalization of vulnerable populations.  For instance, 
Khan et al. (2007) found that a transnational campaign to stop child labor in the football 
stitching industry in Pakistan pushed impoverished local villagers into even more poverty and 
deprived them of their livelihoods.  Kraemer et al. (2013) in their study of an anti-mining 
resistance movement in India described tensions between powerful Western NGOs and local 
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activists with the latter accusing the former of hijacking the movement to suit NGO agendas 
and undermining local resistance movements.  A study of microfinance practices of NGOs in 
rural Bangladesh found that microfinance led to increasing levels of indebtedness among 
already impoverished communities and exacerbated economic, social and environmental 
vulnerabilities (Banerjee & Jackson, 2017). 
 
Studying corporate-community conflicts can provide insights into the limits of CSR 
and highlight the counter-mobilization strategies of corporations.  Nowhere is this more 
evident than conflicts involving the global extractives industry (mining, oil and gas 
extraction) which is one of the largest industries in the world with annual revenues of $5.4 
trillion and operations in more than 100 countries.  Perhaps the most comprehensive list of 
ongoing conflicts over resource extraction can be found in the Environmental Justice Atlas 
(http://ejatlas.org).This comprehensive database catalogues social and environmental 
conflicts arising from resource extraction.  The database currently lists a total of 2097 
conflicts over social and environmental impacts of resource extraction projects including 
mining, forestry, dams, fracking, drilling, exploration, waste management, ore processing and 
others. Environmental impacts (deforestation, air and water pollution, soil contamination), 
social and cultural impacts (dispossession, loss of livelihoods, threats to cultural heritage) as 
well as a lack of participation of affected communities in decision-making are key drivers of 
conflicts. 
 
The geographical scope of resistance movements against extractive industries is 
remarkable.  Here is a partial list of countries where there are ongoing violent conflicts 
between local communities and corporations in the extractives industries:  Angola, Argentina, 
Bangladesh, Brazil, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Laos, 
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Malaysia, Mexico, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tibet, Trinidad & Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  And this is a 
partial list.  
 
It is no coincidence that nearly all of these countries are former colonies.  It is also no 
coincidence that the companies involved in these conflicts are headquartered in countries that 
were colonial rulers.  While the era of direct colonial rule is over neocolonial modes of 
dispossession continue in the postcolonial world this time governed by native elites in the 
former colonies.  Ironically several of these countries now employ colonial era laws that were 
used to imprison independence movement leaders, to incarcerate tribal populations resisting 
occupation of their lands.  Moreover, a significant number of mining projects are operated as 
joint ventures between the state and transnational corporations, which raises questions about 
state interests in dealing with resistance to mining on the one hand while generating profits 
through its mining operations on the other.  State violence and market violence go hand in 
hand in many of these conflicts.  
 
The fact that virtually all the mining corporations involved in community conflicts – 
Shell, BP, Rio Tinto, Anglo American, BHP Billiton to name a few giants – have extensive 
CSR policies and stakeholder initiatives in place and are signatories to several multi-
stakeholder initiatives designed to promote environmental and social welfare, casts serious 
doubts about the effectiveness of CSR (Banerjee, 2018).  Instead corporations and 
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governments use CSR as a weapon to obscure processes of dispossession while presenting a 
positive image to the public.  The rhetoric of  ‘socially responsible mining’ has little currency 
with local communities that are dispossessed by mining activity. Counter-mobilization 
strategies such as CSR can undermine resistance because the energies of subaltern groups 
become dissipated not just in opposing development projects that threaten their livelihoods 
but also in resisting more manipulative and divisive practices of CSR.  
 
The extraction of natural resources raises complex and difficult questions about state 
sovereignty, human rights, Indigenous land rights and cultural survival.  Implementation of 
state led economic development policies also requires particular legal, political and social 
institutions, and most importantly a system of property rights.  Since the state is the ultimate 
guarantor of property rights and human rights it also becomes the most important actor to 
manage conflicts that arise over these rights, as in resource extraction projects for example.  
States maintain the resource extraction system through negotiation, hegemonic 
accommodation and collaboration, and when conflicts occur, states as the only ‘legitimate’ 
purveyor of violence, often use police and armed forces to quell anti-mining resistance. Thus, 
in its role as a guarantor of property rights and as a manager of conflicts the state is also 
responsible for developing appropriate governance structures that enable the socialization of 
risks, through legislation, consultative processes and/or suppression of dissent. 
 
Conflicts between Indigenous communities and the extractive industries are 
essentially over the contested meaning of development and the negative impacts of market-
state imposed models of development on communities.  Many of the ongoing conflicts over 
resource extraction in the developing countries are outcomes of neoliberal polices of 
structural adjustment and privatization dictated by institutions like the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund.  The emergence of the neoliberal state in the 1980s resulted in 
transforming its role from a regulator of the economy to providing and maintaining the 
institutional and material conditions that enable the expansion of capital and private 
enterprise through increased state surveillance and repression.  This neoliberal shift resulted 
in major structural changes in the governance of the political economy, most notably the shift 
from government (state power) to governance, which involves a coalition of market, state and 
civil society actors.  Increasing involvement of private actors in governing the extraction of 
public resources results in legitimizing political frameworks of governance that are not 
democratic and further marginalizes segments of the population that do not have access to 
these new structures of power.  State institutions and practices have been reconfigured as a 
result of the nexus between the state and private capital thus shifting the balance ‘between 
coercion and consent, between the powers of capital and of popular movements, and between 
executive and judicial power, on the one hand, and powers of representative democracy on 
the other’ (Harvey, 2005: 143). 
 
The market-state nexus also enables epistemic violence to dispossess communities.  
In particular Indigenous communities’ connections with land are more a bundle of 
relationships than a bundle of property rights.  Economic valuation of environmental 
resources like forests and wetlands that employ measures such as net present value using 
arbitrary discount rates or return on assets cannot accommodate spiritual and cultural values 
of inhabitants of forests.  For instance in a recent mining conflict in the Indian state of 
Odisha, spirituality, sacredness and culture were key claims in the legal case mounted by the 
Dongria Kondh tribe against the state and the company with their writ petition stating that 
they were ‘protesting against the intrusion into their cultural space’ (Temper & Martinez-
Alier, 2013: 85).  The location of the proposed mine was opposed by the local tribals because 
 6 
it was to be constructed on a mountain called Niyamgiri that the tribals considered to be their 
‘soul’: in the words of a tribal leader ‘without Niyamgiri we cannot think of life.  If we lose 
the mountain we will lose our soul.  Niyamgiri is our soul. If Niyamgiri goes our soul will 
die’ (Kraemer et al., 2013).  That same mountain is a profitable source of bauxite for the 
mining company Vedanta and the state, and according to the company’s mission statement 
‘Vedanta firmly believes in making the local people a participant in the growth process of the 
organization and works as a facilitator of socio-economic transformation of rural parts of 
Odisha’ (Banerjee, 2018).  The problem of course is how does one value a mountain which is 
both the ‘soul’ of a community that inhabits it as well as a profitable non-renewable resource 
for a corporation that can ensure ‘socio-economic transformation’?  These competing and 
incommensurable worldviews will inevitably lead to conflict because contrary to the premise 
of the global economic paradigm ‘there can be no universal metric for comparing and 
exchanging the real values of nature among different groups of people from different 
cultures, and with vastly different degrees of political and economic power’ (McAfee, 1999: 
133).  Or as Marx put it while describing another form of struggle – ‘between two rights, 
force decides’.  State violence was initially used to quell resistance but after a struggle lasting 
more than 10 years the Supreme Court overturned the original judgement approving the mine 
and called for more consultation.  During the legal case, the state government argued that 
environmental activists were ‘romanticizing tribal life’ and that the Dongria Kondh were in 
fact living in ‘abject poverty and deprivation bordering on dehumanizing conditions’, 
engaging in ‘destructive and subsistence agricultural practice’, and that preservation of tribal 
culture and customs did not mean ‘allowing them to lead a life in illiteracy, poverty and 
hunger in perpetuity’ (Banerjee, 2018).  
 
The separation of the economic value of land from its cultural and spiritual value 
provides a justification of land appropriation by the state in the name of economic 
development and poverty reduction. Even the final judgment by the Ministry for 
Environment and Forests denying permission for the mine to proceed specifically rejected 
any cultural claims of loss by tribal communities. According to the Indian Minister of 
Environment, ‘There was no emotion, no politics, no prejudice in this decision… It was not 
because Niyamgiri is considered sacred [by the Dongria Kondhs]. It is a decision on a purely 
legal basis’ (Temper & Martinez-Alier, 2013: 85).  It is the ‘purely legal basis’ of 
development decisions which constitutes the power of the neoliberal sovereign state that 
erodes the internal sovereignty of Indigenous peoples. Land conflicts may well be ‘cultural 
distribution conflicts’ (Escobar, 2006) but the resolution of these conflicts creates inequitable 
outcomes because one set of cultural norms and values that reflect the dominant neoliberal 
state are imposed on people with different cultural norms. 
 
Indigenous peoples all over the world face similar regimes of exclusion and 
dispossession.  In the lawsuit against Exxon following the oil spill from the tanker Exxon 
Valdez a court ruled (based on ‘anthropological evidence’ provided by an Exxon hired 
anthropologist) that the ‘subsistence culture’ of the Alutiq people of southern Alaska had not 
been damaged by the oil spill because ‘culture is deeply embedded in the mind and heart’. 
Consequently there was no loss of cultural resources resulting from the environmental 
disaster and hence no monetary compensation was required (Kirsch, 2001).  Mining 
companies and state interests while publicly acknowledging cultural rights of Indigenous 
communities undermine Indigenous sovereignty by citing ‘national interest’ and the need for 
‘development’, discourses that transmute cultural rights into ‘partnerships’ between mining 
corporations and Indigenous communities. These ‘partnerships’ and ‘agreements’ are 
invariably based on unequal relations of power and do little to address the needs of 
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marginalized communities. For example, in announcing their decision to drill for oil in the 
Arctic, Shell defined the potential impacts on Indigenous communities as follows: 
 
‘The Iñupiat communities treasure their heritage and values and they view the 
sea around them as their garden because it is so critical to their subsistence. 
However, they have also expressed that preserving the most important threads of 
their culture may mean helping to shape the development of resources in their 
sea. In some cases, we have partnered with the community in support of future 
production: in 2014, we signed an agreement with a newly formed Alaskan 
company called Arctic Iñupiat Offshore (AIO) granting them an option to acquire 
an equity interest in Shell’s acreage and activities in the Chukchi Sea if we 
continue our offshore drilling programme in Alaska’ (Shell, 2014). 
 
Exactly how drilling for oil in the Arctic, the ‘garden’ for Indigenous communities, is 
going to ‘shape the development of resources in the sea’ that would ‘preserve the most 
important threads of their culture’ is not made clear in Shell’s report. It is difficult to see how 
an equity interest in Shell’s drilling operation is going to preserve local cultures that have a 
spiritual relationship with ‘their sea’ when it is the very process of oil extraction that can 
cause ecological damage. Cultural values of Indigenous communities are thus once again 
reduced to compensation and ‘partnerships’ that promote extraction and all processes of 
obtaining consent are contingent on securing access to natural resources 
 
 However, it is important to realize that within governable populations there are 
always groups of people that resist governing rationalities and there are lessons to be 
learned from the various anti-corporate resistance movements across the world.  
Market-state violence, however abhorrent also reflects a failure of hegemony.  
Understanding the struggles of communities who are resisting hegemony by refusing to 
give up their lands as ‘sacrifice zones’ for progress and development is an important 
step to imagining alternate ways of being and living in the world.   
 
As we face an increasingly precarious and uncertain future world I cannot but 
help contemplate with the questions asked by the Ghanian novelist Ayi Kwei Armah:  
 
‘How have we come to be mere mirrors to annihilation? For whom do we aspire 
to reflect our people’s death? For whose entertainment shall we sing our agony? 
In what hopes? That the destroyers aspiring to extinguish us, will suffer 
conciliatory remorse at the sight of their own fantastic success?’ (Ayi Kwei 
Armah, Two Thousand Seasons, p. xiii). 
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